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Abstract—Information-Centric Networks (ICN) are promising
alternatives to current Internet architecture since the Internet
struggles with a number of issues such as scalability, mobility
and security. ICN offers a number of potential benefits in-
cluding reduced congestion and enhanced delivery performance
by employing content caching, simpler network configurations
and stronger security for the content. Named Data Networking
(NDN), an instance of the ICN, enables content delivery instead
of host-centric approaches by naming data rather than host. In
order to make NDN practical in the real world, the challenging
issues of content security need to be addressed. In this article,
we examine the architecture, content security as well as possible
solutions to these issues of NDN, with a special focus on the
content integrity and provenance. We propose a variety of
digital signature schemes to achieve the data integrity and
origin authentication in NDN for various applications, which
include cost-effective signatures, privacy preserving signatures,
network coding signatures, and post-quantum signatures. We
also present the speed-up techniques in generating signatures and
verifying signatures such as pre-computation, batch verification
and server-aided verification to reduce the computational cost of
the producers and receivers in NDN. A number of certificate-free
trust management approaches and possible adoptions in NDN are
investigated.
Keywords: Information-Centric Networks, Named Data Net-
working, Content Integrity, Digital Signatures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet, a packet data network in which clients and servers
with a specific IP address can interact over a pre-established
communication channel for conversion, has achieved great
success since its invention 36 years ago. Internet users can
transfer various content such as audio, text, image and video
packets over Internet thanks to the well-known TCP/IP proto-
col. The current Internet’s hourglass architecture focuses on IP
network layer, in which the minimal functionality required for
global interconnectivity is implemented. However, profound
changes in nature of Internet communication have taken place
where massive content are produced and distributed over the
Internet. An increasing number of applications involving data
delivery are concerned more about what data are required
than where the data are from. Moreover, there is no in-
built mechanisms supporting mobility and security in Internet.
Thus, it is fair to say that the Internet architecture poorly
matches its primary use today in the sense that scalable content
distribution is poorly served by the Internet.
The drawbacks of Internet mentioned above motivated peo-
ple to find a promising alternative supporting content-centric
communication to the Internet. Five projects for content-based
Internet paradigms [1] under its Future Internet Architecture
Program were funded by NSF, and Named Data Networking
(NDN) [2] is one of the projects. Different from IP, which
centers on communication end-points via their IP addresses,
NDN does not utilize source and destination addresses but
makes use of data packets with content names. NDN places
data as the highest priority by naming them instead of their
addresses. The employment of content names in NDN com-
munication enables routers to monitor the states of the packets,
which provides additional functions the IP routers cannot offer.
The NDN packets are independent of their location, which
supports in-network caching of contents for future use and
supports consumer with different positions inherently.
In the NDN project(named-data.net), NDN was described
with the similar layered hourglass architecture [2] as that of the
Internet except a few different functions between correspond-
ing network layers as shown in Fig. 1. To be more specific,
firstly, the network service in the Internet is delivering packets
to a specified destination IP address while it reteives data with
a unique defined name in NDN. The main overlays in NDN
are named content chunks while the fundamental element of
Internet is a channel between two endpoints with a unique IP
address. Secondly, there are two new layers named security
and strategy in NDN protocol stack. Security layer guarantees
the security of content, rather than the whole communication
channel, while strategy layer is for NDN forwarding plane,
where the functions of Internet’s transport layer are embeded,
thus no need for some separate transport layers in NDN.
II. ARCHITECTURE OF NDN
NDN adopts a hierarchial structure [2], which is user
friendly, to construct content names. Each name might consist
of multiple parts: source of the content, the file name, version
of the content, e.g., we can name segment 1 of version 1 of a
SNNU picture like /snnu/images/a.jpg/v1/s1, where the
sign ”/” denotes the boundary of each part of the name. With
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Fig. 1. Internet and NDN Hourglass Architectures
the help of hierarchial namespaces and naming conventions,
a consumer and a provider can always construct the same
content name in this hierarchial structure, thus NDN can fetch
desirable content by names.
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Fig. 2. Packets in the NDN Architecture
Communication in NDN [2] involves two types of pack-
ets: Interest and Data as well as three types of roles:
Consumer, Provider and Router. As indicated in Fig. 2,
content names are embedded in both packets to ensure that
each Interest package has one and only one Data package
paired with it. An abbreviated process shown in Fig. 3 tells a
round of content search and retrieval. The Consumer issues
an Interest packet including the name of a desired content
and sends the packet to the network. Then the Interest packet
will travel through NDN Routers which own the capacity of
caching and forwarding packets. When the Interest packet
arrives at the node which indeed generates the requested
content, this node, termed as Producer, returns a Data packet
containing the consistent name and the specific content. The
Data packet just reverses the incoming path of the Interest
packet to reach the Consumer.
The data structures maintained by NDN routers include a
Content Store (CS), a Pending Interest Table (PIT) and
a Forwarding Information Base (FIB). CS stores data
packets passing through a router. Because of the special packet
structure, the data can be cached for future reuse. Once the
Interest reaches a router that caches the required data, it will
return a data packet to the consumer immediately. Owing to
the limitation of cache size, these data packets will be dropped
directly (lifetime expires) or replaced by new data packets
(cache is full) according to the caching policy. PIT maintains
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Fig. 3. An Abbreviated Version of NDN
a record for the data name carried in Interest packet as well
as its incoming faces. If the router receives a Data packet, but
there is no record about its name in PIT, the router will drop
the packet directly. FIB maintains an entry for name prefix and
outgoing faces. When the content name doesn’t exist in CS and
PIT, FIB will forward the Interest to the corresponding next-
hops. In extreme cases, there is no prefix-name matches the
Interest packet, FIB may trigger the router to explore potential
alternate paths. Forwarding Strategy model makes these
three parts work closely together.
Let us explain how NDN works with a concrete example
shown in Fig. 4. Suppose a consumer wants to fetch the
content a.jpg mentioned above. The consumer initializes an
Interest packet and forwards it to the network. When an NDN
router gets the Interest packet from its incoming face, the
router firstly searches the entire of CS for matching data. If
there exists the content, the router returns the Data packet
immediately through the face where the Interest came and
discard the Interest. Once the CS miss caching the required
data, the router checks whether the name already exists in
PIT. If so, adding the face into this entry’s incoming face(s)
list and discarding this Interest. Otherwise, the router looks
up in FIB for the longest-prefix matching to find out where to
forward the Interest. Meanwhile, the router adds a new record
in PIT including name and incoming face information. After
receiving the feedback Data packet with the exact-match name
from another router, the router erases the corresponding record
in PIT and forwards the Data packet to the consumer through
incoming face(s) information. Finally, the router stores a copy
of the Data packet for future reuse, thus saving the bandwidth
and reducing the time consumption in data retrieval.
III. CONTENT-CENTRIC SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NDN
NDN concentrates on information objects or contents re-
trieval from a network instead of the location of these contents
[2]. Thus, securing the contents themselves in NDN is more
important than protecting the infrastructure of the network.
In NDN, content security is a challenge since there exist a
number of security concerns of NDN content including naming
related attacks, caching related attacks, routing related attacks
and other attacks [3].
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Fig. 4. Forwarding Process of an NDN Node
Naming related attacks. Watchlist and sniffing attacks are
two types of naming related attacks. Different from TCP/IP
protocol, in which an address represents a host in the network
and is not semantically related to the content, NDN names
the content for facilitating data dissemination and routes the
content based on the content names. This approach causes
security risks as the content names are visible and semantically
correlated to the content itself. Adversaries are able to monitor
Internet usage with the visible content requests, which puts
the NDN publisher’s privacy a worse situation. Moreover,
denial of service may occur as an adversary can prevent NDN
users from requesting for the marked content, which leads to
unanswered requests.
Caching related attacks. Content caching at intermediate
nodes which is also referred to as in-network storage, is
fundamentally necessary to support P2P data delivery in NDN
at low communication cost. There are a number of benefits
using caching in NDN, such as dissociating contents from
their producers, avoiding single point of failure, reducing the
network load and data dissemination latency, etc. NDN is
built on consumer driven caching with target to delivering the
closest copy available to a subscriber. Thus, NDN is vulnerable
to caching related attacks including time analysis, caching
pollution and bogus announcements. Time analysis can violate
users’ privacy by recognizing if a user requested a content or
not. Caching pollution attack states that users will be served
with illegitimate content by a polluted cache, once the cache
has been poisoned by an attacker. In a bogus announcement
attack, an adversary sends a mass of announcement updates
for content at a frequency exceeding the local content request
routing convergence time to damage the caching and routing
systems. As a result, the overloaded bogus contents make the
subscribers fail to retrieve complete or correct content.
Routing related attacks. In NDN, the content delivery
relies much on asynchronous publication and subscription.
Thus, some attacks such as jamming attack and time attack
may come into being to violate this state consistency. There
exist other routing and forwarding related attacks such as
flooding attack to exhaust the resources such as memory and
computational power which are employed to maintain and
exchange content states. Routing related attacks can lead to
denial of service, resource exhaustion, path infiltration and
privacy leakage.
Other attacks. There are some other attacks that do not
fall into the aforementioned categories, which might cause
insufficient or incorrect data distribution in NDN. In packet
mistreatment scenario, an adversary accesses NDN nodes to
modify packets during transmission, reply the consumer plenty
of times or pretend to be the publisher to create content.
Unauthorized access attacks, which enable an adversary to
access some content sent to legitimate users that he/she has no
right to access, becomes easier as an adversary can use any
available copy of a content distributed in different network
locations. These attacks can lead to unauthorized access to
content, congestion and denial of service etc.
IV. PROTECTING CONTENT WITH DIGITAL SIGNATURES
As the cryptographic analogue of handwritten signatures,
digital signatures are a useful cryptographic primitive for
authenticating an entity and validating the integrity of a
message. As a fundamental security guarantee of NDN, a
digital signature scheme is employed to sign the name of
each NDN packet together with the packet content, which
provides content integrity and origin authentication by binding
the name and the data of the packet. This approach separates
trust in content and in entities, which makes the globally
addressable content publicly authenticated. A consumer who is
the requester of some content can validate the signature and
a router can also choose to check the content integrity and
provenance with the signature. Moreover, named and signed
content forms a solid foundation for building a number of
applications such as a web browser protocol handler, a media
streaming.
Finding appropriate digital signature schemes to secure
NDN packet is challenging. Firstly, to sign and validate
every packet requires an ominous need for high efficiency
in signature generation, verification, transmission and storage.
Secondly, a publisher’s signatures on packets may leak his
information such as his public key since this information is
mandatory in signature verification. Thirdly, when a quantum
computer comes into being, it can break all digital signature
schemes used today. What kind of digital signature algorithms
can be used in NDN in the age of quantum computers? Finally,
signature validation of NDN content only reveals that the
signature was generated with a particular key and thus, key
management [4], [5] becomes a fundamental issue in NDN
content security.
A. Digital signatures
A digital signature scheme [6] usually involves a signer
and a set of verifiers. The signer begins with a key-generation
algorithm to generate a key pair including a public key pk and
a private key sk. With the key pair, a digital signature scheme
allows the signer to sign a message m following the Sign
algorithm to generate a digital signature on a message m such
that a verifier who knows pk can use the corresponding Verify
algorithm to validate that m is originated from the signer and
keeps virgin.
1) Cost-effective digital signatures: Choosing cost-effective
fine-grained signature schemes to sign Internet packets is a
major challenge for the publisher in NDN network. NDN
currently offers two choices, RSA [6] and ECDSA [7], as
signature algorithms.
Let p and q be two odd primes and N is their product. A
signer’s public key is e and private key is d where the product
of d and e is congruent to 1 modulo the value of Euler’s phi
function. To generate a signature of message m, the signer
firstly computes the hash value of m, and then the signature
of m, that is the hash value to the power of d. A verifier
checks if the hash value of m equals to the signature value of
m to verify a signature. When one uses a 1024-bit modulus,
the size of a RSA signature is 1024-bit, which might be too
long to be employed in NDN content verification.
g denotes a generator of a group G of prime order q, and h
is an arbitrary element of G. The discrete logarithm of h with
respect to g is defined as the smallest non-negative integer
x such that h equals to the value of g to the power of x.
Discrete logarithm assumption says that it is hard to find the
integer x given g and h. A number of cost-effective digital
signature schemes have been proposed based on discrete
logarithm assumption, and the Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA), the core of Digital Signature Standard (DSS), is among
the representative signature algorithms. When one uses a 1024-
bit modulus, a DSA signature is 320 bits long. ECDSA, the
variants of DSA based on elliptic curve, is 320-bit long as
well.
Another cost-effective digital signature is the BLS short
signature from the Weil pairing [6] due to Boneh, Lynn and
Shacham. BLS signature is approximately 170 bits long while
offers a security level similar to that of 320-bit DSA signature.
The unforgeability of BLS signature depends on the CDH
assumption on some elliptic curves over a finite field.
2) Privacy-preserving digital signatures: Digital signatures
can bind content to its publisher, however, ordinary cost-
effective signatures are publicly verifiable, which may leak
sensitive identity information of the publisher. The privacy
disclosure of publisher’s identity is dangerous in NDN es-
pecially when considering censorship and monitoring since
an adversary is able to identify the content from certain
publishers easily from the public key explicitly stated at very
NDN packet. We introduce two types of privacy-preserving
digital signatures namely group signature and ring signature,
to protect signature privacy, where the identity of the publisher
can be hidden among a group of users.
Different from traditional digital signature schemes where
only one signer is involved, group signatures [11] can conceal
the identity of the signer with a group of members such
that the verifier can be convinced that the signer is in the
group but the real identify of the signer is unknown. In
a group signature, a group manager is involved to build
the group, add and revoke group members. The property of
signer-ambiguity makes group signature an important building
block in a variety of applications where identity privacy is a
concern. Group signatures can be applied to NDN to protect
publisher’s identity privacy, but the presence of a trusted group
manager limits group signatures to settings with collaborating
publishers.
Collaboration between signers is not always possible, ring
signature[8], a simplified group signature, can provide ad-
hoc group with no trusted group manager. Ring signatures
can provide unconditional 1-out-of-n anonymity. Besides, ring
signatures satisfy spontaneity and unlinkability. The property
of spontaneity of ring signature refers to the unawareness
of other members being involved in the ring. Unlinkability
states that two signatures generated by the same signer cannot
be linked in any possible way. In ring signatures, singers
can choose other users at his will to form a ring, which is
more practical to implement for a NDN publisher due to no
need to manage a group. Two challenges are posed if ring
signatures are applied to protect NDN publisher’s identity
privacy: how to trace a malicious publisher for poisonous
content and censorship might be still possible if using a small
ring. The potential solutions are employing accountable ring
signature and a bigger ring.
3) Network coding signatures: NDN takes advantage of
the traditional “store and forward” paradigm in the network.
To increase the handling ability of the network and improve
robustness against random faults in NDN network, we can
integrate network coding [9] with NDN, since intermediate
nodes in NDN have a certain storage and computing ability.
Homomorphic signature [10] can be applied to NDN network
with network coding. When an interest packet comes to a
NDN producer, the producer divides the corresponding data
into an ordered sequence of n-dimensional vectors. Before
transmitted to network, the producer generates m augmented
vectors by concatenating an m-bit long vector with every
original vector vi, which contains ’1’ only at the ith point
and ’0’ at the other positions. Thus, the linear combination
coefficients are included in the right-most m positions. Then
the augmented vectors are sent to the NDN consumer together
with the producer’s signatures. Routers in NDN can linearly
combine the data packet produced by the same producer as
well as their signatures due to the homomorphic property of
the signature. Finally, the consumer is able to retrieve the
original data from sufficiently random linear combinations in
a full rank matrix.
4) Post-quantum digital signatures: Quantum computers
can solve some computationally intractable mathematical
problems efficiently, like factoring problem and discrete log-
arithm problem. That is, the classical digital signature al-
gorithms used today are not secure any longer in quantum
computer era and thus cannot be used in NDN network.
Fortunately, there still exists some mathematical problems
that cannot be efficiently solved by a quantum computer,
such as the closest vector problem, the decoding problem and
finding the solution of multi-variate quadratic systems. Based
on these intractable problems, four types of post-quantum
signature schemes, namely multivariate signatures, code-based
signatures, hash-based signatures, and lattice-based signatures
have received extensive attention.
B. Signature implementation
In this section, we show the implementations of the selected
digital signatures, including RSA [6], DSA [6], BLS [6],
ECDSA [7], a group signature [11] and a ring signature [8].
Environment. All the algorithms are conducted on a desk-
top with 64-bit Win 10 operating system and 16.0 GB RAM.
The processor is Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700 CPU @3.6GHz.
We implement the programs in C++ projects with the help of
the interfaces in Miracl library 1 to realize the operations in
big integers and elliptic curve groups and compile the projects
in VS 2010.
Parameters. The parameters in the implemented algorithms
are fixed with the reference of ANSI X9 and Federal Infor-
mation Processing Standards(FIPS 186-4, 2013)2, a golden
standard of digital signatures by National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST). NIST and ANSI X9 have set the
minimum key length requirement, in which RSA and DSA are
1024 bits, and ECC is 160 bits, with the equivalent security
of the corresponding symmetric block cipher a key length of
80 bits. The concrete settings are specified as follows. For
RSA, we set the module N 1024 bits, p and q 512 bits, which
satisfies |p− q| > 2412. For DSA, p and q are selected to be
1024 bits and 160 bits respectively. For ECDSA, we employ
a pseudo-random curve over prime field GF (p) where a is -3
and the cofactor is 1, which is one of the recommended elliptic
curves by NIST for Federal Government use3. For BLS, we
select Miyaji-Nakabayashi-Takano (MNT) nonsupersingular
curves [12], in which the embedding degree is 6 and the
cofactor is 2. Both group signature and ring signature are DL-
based, which can share the parameters in DSA. The sizes of
the group and ring are fixed as 5.
Implementation Results. To test KeyGen, Sign and Verify
algorithms of each scheme, we repeat each algorithm 1,000
times and get the average running time. The result is shown
in Fig 5. In KeyGen, the most expensive scheme is group
signature with 4.059 ms time consumption, whereas ring
signature, with the same number of users, only costs 0.599
ms, which is almost the same magnitude with DSA. It takes
the least for RSA to generate a key pair. As for ECC-based
BLS and ECDSA, the running time is 2.400 ms and 1.890 ms
respectively. In Sign scheme, ring signature costs the most
time of 4.575 ms, followed by RSA 3.274 ms. The other
four schemes are all µs-level. For Verify, the ring signature
is the most time-consuming one with the performance 6.869
ms, followed by BLS 4.600 ms, group signature 3.050 ms,
ECDSA 2.000 ms, DSA 1.869 ms and RSA 1.274 ms.
1https://certivox.org/display/EXT/MIRACL
2FIPS PUB 186-4: Federal information processing standards publication.
Digital Signature Standard (DSS). NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, 20899-8900,
2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4. Access on July 2013.
3https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/digital-signatures
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Fig. 5. Implementation
C. Enhancing digital signatures’ performance
We introduce some techniques to enhance the performance
of digital signatures from three aspects, namely speeding up
the signature generation, speeding up the signature verification
and reducing the bandwidth of digital signatures.
1) Speeding up signature generation.: Pre-computation is
an important and widely used technique to make the signa-
ture generation faster. Online/offline signatures was proposed
aiming to improve the signature generation by computing a
signature in two phases: off-line phase (before the message to
be signed is presented) and on-line phase (after the message
to be signed is given). Shamir et al. [13] presented an efficient
approach by using a trapdoor hash function such as chameleon
hash. With this transformation, any signature scheme is able to
be transformed into a highly efficient on-line/off-line signature
and the signature size does not increase too much.
2) Speeding up signature verification.: Verification cost of
a digital signature is likely a more important factor than that
of signature generation as a digital signature is generated once
but may be verified many times. Batch verification and server-
aided verification are two kinds of techniques to significantly
reduce the signature verification time. Batch verification [14]
enables a verifier to take less time in validating multiple
digital signatures simultaneously than the overall time for
all the single signature verification. Various digital signatures
such as RSA, ECDSA and BLS signture have got their
batch verification algorithm. Some algorithms support batch
verification for the signatures from the same signer while a
few algorithms allows batch verification for many different
signers. Server-aided verification can speed up the signature
verification by delegating a substantial part of computations to
a powerful but possibly untrusted server. The computational
cost of signature verification such as BLS signature can be
decreased by around 70% with server-aided verification.
3) Reducing signature bandwidth.: The communication
cost is a major issue of signature performance since signa-
ture transmission usually consumes more power than that of
signature generation and verification. Signature aggregation is
an important and commonly used technique to save commu-
nication bandwidth when transmitting signatures. NDN can
adopt signature aggregation to achieve this type of signature
compression. A publisher signs n distinct packets and obtains
n signatures on these packets, and then aggregates all the
signatures into a single signature, which can convince a
consumer that the publisher signed the n packets. A number
of digital signatures such as RSA signature and BLS signature
can be aggregated.
D. Trust Management
A valid signature on a NDN content only indicates that
this signature was indeed generated with a particular key
and trust management is mandatory to make this knowledge
useful. Hierarchical public key infrastructure (PKI) has been
built but suffers usability problems in the previous research in
trust management in networks. To authenticate a public key,
a digital certificate, a digitally signed statement binding the
identity of an entity and his public key, is employed in PKI.
However, PKI based trust management has received a lot of
criticism due to its complexity of supporting certificates.
Some certificate-free trust management approaches can be
potential solutions to address NDN trust management is-
sue. We introduce four paradigms of certificate-free trust
management mechanisms briefly, namely self-certified trust
management, identity-based trust management, certificateless
trust management, and certificate-based trust management.
The trick of self-certified trust management is the public key
is jointly generated by the signer and the authority such that
the certificate is embedded in the public key itself. Public keys
in identity-based trust management are derived directly from
user identities such as email address, IP address etc while
the private key is generated by a trusted third party. The
elimination of certificates in identity-based trust management
brings a number of benefits such as no certificate look up, no
certificate management and no certificate revocation etc. The
disadvantage of this approach is key escrow, that is, the trusted
third party knows the private keys of all users. Certificateless
and certificate-based trust management can reduce the trust
levels of the trusted third party in identity-based trust manage-
ment as in these systems, the full public key of a user is based
on user-generated public key component and the user’s identity
while the full private key is created from user-generated private
key component and the private key component generated by
the semi-trusted third party. Recently, blockchain based PKI
attracted some attention and Emercoin 4, a blockchain-based
cryptocurrency that storages different public key types has
been developed.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we investigated content integrity and prove-
nance issue in NDN and concluded that digital signature is a
fundamental and essential tool to address this issue. We in-
troduced diverse digital signatures to achieve content integrity
and origin authentication in NDN for various scenarios. We
also proposed different techniques to speed up the signature
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emercoin
generation and verification to make signatures practical in
NDN. Several types of certificate-free trust management was
introduced as well to manage the keys of signature schemes.
Our future research is to deploy these signatures and tech-
niques in the real-world NDN environment.
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